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We analyze a seldom used, but highly promising form of rights-based management over common
pool resources that involves the self-selection of heterogeneous fishermen into sectors. The fishery
management regime assigns one portion of an overall catch quota to a voluntary cooperative, with
the remainder exploited as a commons by those choosing to fish independently. Data from an Alaska
commercial salmon fishery confirm our model’s key predictions, that the co-op would facilitate the
consolidation of fishing effort, coordination of harvest activities, sharing of information and provision
of shared infrastructure. We estimate that the resulting rent gains were at least 25%. A lawsuit filed
by two disgruntled independents led to the co-op’s demise, an outcome also predicted by our model.
Our analysis provides guidance for designing fishery reform that leads to Pareto improvements for
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We analyze a seldom used, but highly promising form of rights-based management over common 
pool resources that involves the self-selection of heterogeneous fishermen into sectors.  The 
fishery management regime assigns one portion of an overall catch quota to a voluntary 
cooperative, with the remainder exploited as a commons by those choosing to fish independently. 
Data from an Alaska commercial salmon fishery confirm our model’s key predictions, that the 
co-op would facilitate the consolidation of fishing effort, coordination of harvest activities, 
sharing of information and provision of shared infrastructure. We estimate that the resulting rent 
gains were at least 25%.  A lawsuit filed by two disgruntled independents led to the co-op’s 
demise, an outcome also predicted by our model.  Our analysis provides guidance for designing 
fishery reform that leads to Pareto improvements for fishermen of all skill levels, which suggests 
a structure that enables reform without losers. 
 




The common pool problem illustrates a key insight from economics—that individually 
rational behavior can lead to a suboptimal outcome.
1 After decades of study and years of practical 
experience, there is broad consensus that property rights-based management can solve the 
common pool problem in a variety of contexts.
2 Ironically, however, little progress has been 
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1 Two seminal contributions are Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955). 
2 By ‘rights-based management’ we mean creation of rights to the good, or bad, in question and reliance on 
market transactions to allocate these rights. By ‘solve’ we mean that such systems can allocate a given 
quantity efficiently. Applications include markets for rights to emit sulfur dioxide and other air pollutants 
  1made implementing this solution in the fishery, the iconic example of a common pool resource; 
despite the collapse of economically important fisheries around the world, management schemes 
based on granting quantitative rights to the catch are used in less than 2% of the world’s 
fisheries.
3 Apparently, implementation of rights-based management of fisheries and other 
common pool resources has been hindered by the transactions costs involved in shifting away 
from an existing regulatory regime.
4 In the fishery, individuals who are well-suited to competing 
under an existing regime have incentives to block the transition.
5  
We examine a variant of rights-based management that has the potential to overcome this 
incentive to block. In the system we examine the regulator assigns a portion of the aggregate 
catch to a group of harvesters, formed voluntarily, to manage as the group decides. Those 
choosing not to join continue to fish independently, under the prior regime. Under conditions we 
spell out, the transition to a cooperative-based fishery management regime can be Pareto 
improving, a feature that enables ‘reform without losers’ in the sense of Lau, et al. (2000). These 
authors point out that designing policy reform to be Pareto improving (by protecting status quo 
rents under the preexisting regime) minimizes political opposition; they cite this as a feature that 
enabled China’s economic reforms over the last 30 years, as well as less sweeping policy shifts 
elsewhere. 
6  
The policy of assigning a portion of the allowed catch to a group that is empowered by 
contract to allocate its members’ resources in a unified way gives the co-op the same contractual 
structure as the firm. As Coase (1937) pointed out, allocating inputs centrally via contracts with a 
manager rather than across markets allows an enterprise with this structure to capture gains from 
coordination without incurring excessive transactions costs.
7 Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
extended this insight, arguing that the gains to coordination are greatest when production requires 
                                                                                                                                                 
as well as greenhouse gasses. See Tietenberg (2002) for a review. On the use of a rights-based regime to 
manage common pool groundwater, see Provencher and Burt (1994). 
3Costello, et al. (2008). These systems, often called ‘catch share’ or ‘individual transferable quota’ systems, 
have been shown to yield significant efficiency gains. The individual transferable quota, or ITQ, is a widely 
promoted rights-based system in which quantitative rights to portions of a fixed total catch are assigned to 
individuals and may be traded. The collapse of fisheries is described and documented in several studies 
(see, Halpern et al. 2008; Myers and Worm, 2003; Jackson et al. 2001; Worm et al. 2006).  While pollution, 
climate change, and habitat damage have all been implicated, poor governance structures are widely 
believed to be the root cause (Beddington et al. 2007; Hilborn et al 2005, Wilen 2005).  
4 Libecap and Wiggins (1984) and Wiggins and Libecap (1985) show that rights-based approaches to 
managing common oil reservoirs also suffer from scant implementation due to transactions costs.  
5 Compounding the problem, inefficient fishery regulation can induce excessive investment in vessels and 
processing plants. Owners of this capital have incentives to resist regulatory change that would eliminate or 
impair its value.  
6 We focus on Pareto improvements without side payments. Conditions ensuring a Pareto improvement 
clearly depend on the form of the pre-existing regulation.  
7 In fact, Coase (1937) refers to the firm’s manager as an ‘entrepreneur-coordinator’.  
  2the use of a shared input. Use of a shared input is a hallmark of commercial fishing and other 
activities based on common pool extraction, as the pool itself is jointly used by all participants.
8  
We contribute to the literature on common pool management by developing a model of 
this alternative regime and testing its implications with available data. Our analysis is motivated 
by the formation of a salmon harvesting cooperative that operated in Chignik, Alaska during 
2002-2004. Data from this fishery and other nearby fisheries form the basis for empirical tests. 
Originally, the Chignik sockeye salmon fishery was regulated by a limit on licenses and by 
closing the season when a target level of catch was reached, a common form of management 
known to induce a race to fish.
 9 Allowing a voluntary co-op to form, with non-joiners fishing as 
before, led to a dramatic increase in the profitability of the fishery — by causing changes in the 
length of the fishing season, the number of permit holders who actually fished, the spatial and 
temporal deployment of effort, and the coordination of effort across fishermen. The co-op’s 
demise in 2005, the result of a lawsuit, is an important part of the story that we examine in some 
detail. Our model and empirical analysis focus on these behavioral shifts and on whether the 
regime change was (or could have been) Pareto improving. 
Two aspects of the regime we examine, the voluntary joining decision and assignment of 
some catch rights to a group rather than entirely to separate individuals, are noteworthy and link 
our analysis to broader literatures. Because joining the co-op is voluntary, the disgruntled can opt 
out and this makes Pareto improvements easier to attain. This feature also implies, however, that 
the final outcome generally will not be Pareto optimal. The reason is that, with variations in 
fishing skill, some fishermen will opt to stay with the original regime which is known to be 
inefficient. The co-op we examine forms voluntarily and provides excludable, shared inputs for 
members, i.e., club goods. As a consequence our theory and empirical work contribute to the 
broad literature on the theory of clubs (Cornes and Sandler, 1996). In addition to forming 
voluntarily, the co-op coordinates its members’ decisions, while non-joiners form an 
uncoordinated fringe. Models of cartel formation (d’Aspremont, et al., 1983) and international 
environmental agreements (Barrett, 1994; Kolstad and Ulph, 2008) have the same structure, so 
our results may make useful contributions to empirical knowledge of how such structures 
function. The fishery cooperative also shares important features with worker-formed teams—
voluntarily formed groups of workers that coordinate members’ actions and are paid on the basis 
of overall team productivity (Hamilton, et al. 2003). Our analysis sheds light on two central 
                                                 
8 Scott (2000) argues persuasively for assigning management responsibilities to fishery-wide firms or 
harvester associations for similar reasons. Scott also noted gains from coordinating harvesting activity in 
his original (Scott, 1955) contribution, but this point was overlooked in the literature that followed. 
9 The ‘race’ and its consequences have been extensively documented in the literature; see Wilen (2005). 
  3questions from the worker-team literature: the productivity gains attainable by groups of workers 
who self-coordinate, and the distinguishing attributes of those who choose to join.  
Several features of the Chignik experiment make it ideal for empirical analysis of these 
aspects of regime change. First, each sector fished at separate times that were determined by 
fishery regulators; the co-op as a coordinated fleet and the independents as competitive 
individuals. This feature allows us to cleanly compare how within-season behavior differed under 
cooperative and competitive fishing.
10 Second, there were two regime shifts at Chignik, each 
moving in an opposite direction. In 2002 the co-op policy supplanted limited entry fishing with a 
single fishery-wide season, and in early 2005 an Alaska Supreme court decision shut down the 
co-op, abruptly reinstating the original system. These policy treatments help us to cleanly 
separate the co-op’s fishery-wide effects from fishery specific time trends.
 11  Third, the skill of 
the 100 permit holders at Chignik varied substantially. This fact enables us to assess how fishing 
skill affected the decision to join or remain independent and also how relative skill affected which 
co-op fishermen actively fished as co-op ‘employees’.  
Our findings generally confirm theoretical predictions by us and others—that coordinated 
use of a common pool resource can end the race to extract and enhance rent capture (see, e.g., 
Wilson, 1990; Scott, 2000). Some of the co-op’s gains were realized by consolidating effort 
among its higher skilled fishermen and by increasing the value of the output, the efficiency 
channels often emphasized in discussions of fishery reform.
12 However, the co-op achieved 
additional gains through channels seldom mentioned in the reform literature: by coordinating on 
the location and timing of fishing, by sharing information on stock locations and by providing 
shared infrastructure.
13 We find no evidence of such behavior by independents. Despite clear 
evidence of an aggregate rent gain, the lawsuit filed by two independents indicates that some felt 
disadvantaged by the regime change. This motivates us to derive conditions under which allowing 
                                                 
10 The migratory nature of the species, sockeye salmon, made it possible for the regulator to separate the 
stock between the two groups of fishermen by opening and closing separate seasons for each. By this sort 
of separation, one group’s harvesting opportunities were unaffected by the actions of the other group. 
Clearly, such separation is not possible for all common pool resources. 
11 The fact that the treatment “switch” was turned on, and then off, strengthens the case that the change in 
behavior of the treated fishery between treated and untreated periods is causal (Meyer, 1995, p. 158). 
12 These are key benefits of ITQ reforms, which is the most common type of rights-based system used in 
the industrialized world (see Grafton et. al. 2000, Hannesson 2004, Leal 2002, Linn 2008, Newell et. al. 
2005).  
13 Several authors have identified conditions under which a simple assignment of rights, e.g. shares of an 
ITQ fishery, will not fully incentivize profit maximizing behavior (Boyce, 1992; Costello and Deacon, 
2007). An emerging body of evidence examines the efficiency effects of cooperative management, 
including the contracting problems therein (Johnson and Libecap, 1982; Ostrom, 1990; Wilson, 1990; 
Knapp and Hill, 2003; Costello and Deacon, 2007). Others argue that dividing a total catch between two 
sectors, as when a share is allocated to a cooperative, is likely to be a much simpler negotiating task than 
allocating unique shares to all individual harvesters (Matulich et al., 2001). 
  4a voluntary co-op to form will be Pareto improving and to see if these conditions were met at 
Chignik. 
In the following section we develop a model of the cooperative-based management 
regime and derive a number of predictions regarding membership, fishing intensity, efficiency, 
public input provision, and profitability in each sector. The model also provides conditions 
describing how the catch must be divided in order to yield a Pareto improvement. Section 3 
presents empirical tests of the model’s predictions and estimates of the rent gains from allowing 
the co-op to form. Section 4 describes the court decision that eventually ended the co-op and 
draws lessons for the implementation of this approach to common pool resource management 
more generally. It also comments on the practical importance of our results for the ecological and 





The policy we examine grants permit holders the option to either join a profit-sharing 
cooperative or to remain independent. A fishery-wide total allowable catch (TAC), determined by 
the regulator, is divided into two portions that are separable across time or space, one for the co-
op and the other for independents. Under the original policy all license holders fished 
competitively until the TAC was reached, at which point the entire fishery was closed. 
 This 
regime, which naturally encourages a race to fish, still applies to the group choosing to remain 
independent, so their individual success depends on skill and prior investments in racing capital.
14 
Those who join the co-op act under the direction of a central manager who seeks to maximize the 
co-op’s profit. We examine how behavior differs between the two sectors as well as the gains and 
losses individual fishermen experience when the co-op is allowed to form.   
Our model takes as given the size of the stock and the regulator’s TAC and focuses on 
the within-season activities of a fixed number of license holders. It incorporates three features 
that are present in many actual fisheries: (1) heterogeneity in the skill levels and alternative 
employment opportunities of individual fishermen; (2) heterogeneity over time and/or space in 
the unit value of the stock; and (3) the potential for fishermen to gain, collectively, by sharing 
information, infrastructure or other public inputs. These features allow us to examine three 
important aspects of the allocation of fishing effort: (1) avoiding redundant capacity and 
assigning fishing activity to the most efficient fishing units, sometimes referred to as 
                                                 
14 This form of management is common in U.S., Canadian, and European waters. 
  5‘rationalization’ of effort; (2) coordinating effort over time and space to avoid races for the most 
valuable portions of the stock; (3) providing efficient levels of public inputs. 
Fishing skill is parameterized by the term γ, which we interpret as the rate at with a 
fisherman can apply effort. Fisherman h’s total effort is the product of γh and the time h spends 
fishing, Th.  We parameterize the opportunity cost of time with φ. If h has an attractive opportunity 
in another fishery that operates at the same time, or in an entirely different occupation, φh will be 
large. 
The unit value of the stock varies over space because it migrates toward a port where 
fishing vessels and processing facilities are based and the cost per unit effort falls as the stock 
comes nearer.
15 We parameterize this by dividing the fishing grounds into two zones and 
regarding the distance to each as a single value, 0 or d . These zones are called ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’, respectively, and distance is normalized so that fishing at an additional unit of distance 
increases the cost per unit effort by 1 unit.
16 We assume the stock spends time T  in each zone. 
The cost per unit effort can be reduced by the availability of a public good input, G. 
Examples of G include shared information on stock locations and shared infrastructure. 
Individual contributions to the public good, denoted xh, are costly to contributors and total 
provision of G is determined by the aggregate amount contributed. Later, we allow for separate 
provision by two groups of harvesters and specify that the benefits of a public input are restricted 
to the group that provides it, i.e., it is a club good. 
Combining these components and including a common cost per unit effort parameter α, 
fisherman h’s total cost is 
 
  h h h h h h h h h x T T x G d c + + Σ − + = φ γ α )} ( { . (1) 
 
The expression in brackets includes all cost components that are proportional to h’s effort. We 
assume , , and  0 ) 0 ( = G 0 > ′ G 0 < ′ ′ G h G dh ∀ > ⋅ − + 0 ) ( α . 
Total catch, Q, is assumed to be a linearly homogeneous function of aggregate effort, E, 
and the stock, Z. The fishing technology is represented by 
 
                                                 
15 Because the stock migrates along a route, this variability could be characterized as occurring over time. 
16 The decision to fish inside versus outside can be taken literally or as a metaphor for a broader class of 
gains from coordination. Coordination gains from timing harvest activities, improving catch quality and 
sharing information are described in the next section.  
  6  ) ( Z E ZF Q =  (2) 
 
where , ,  and 0 > ′ F 0 < ′ ′ F 0 ) 0 ( = F 1 ) ( < Z E F . Fig. 1 illustrates the catch technology.  Given an 
available stock, Z, applying units of effort will yield a catch of . If that effort is applied 
sequentially, with units applied first and
T E T Q
0 E 0 E ET − units subsequently, the first ‘batch’ of effort 
yields a catch of  ) ( ZF 0 E Z  and the second yields a residual catch of 
)) ( ) E F Z − ( ( E F T 0 0 Z Q = Z QT − . Concavity of  ) (⋅ F  implies that catch per unit effort for the 
first application of effort (slope of line ab) is greater than for the second (slope of line bc).  
 
 
  In the case we examine the stock migrates toward port and the batches of effort 
correspond to effort applied in the two distance zones. Individuals who fish outside are the first to 
apply effort and therefore achieve a higher catch per unit effort than those who fish inside. All 
those fishing in a given distance zone are assumed to experience the same catch per unit effort.
17 
The regulator’s goal is an escapement target of Z ) 1 ( β − , implying that the TAC 
equals Z β . Given (2) this implies that total effort must satisfy . Total effort for a set 
of fishermen is
) (β
1 − ≤ ZF E
h h h T γ Σ and the regulator meets the TAC by constraining fishing times to satisfy 
 
  . (3)  κ β γ ≡ ≤ Σ
− ) (
1 ZF Th h h
 
                                                 
17 Costello and Deacon (2007) apply similar reasoning to harvesting of a non-migratory stock that inhabits 
patches at varying distances from port. 
Effort, E
Z 
Fig. 1. Catch effort function 









  7Before fishing starts harvesters are allowed to join a co-op that will coordinate its 
members’ effort, with the goal of maximizing total co-op profit. Those not joining choose 
distance, time spent fishing and public input contributions individually, taking as given the 
decisions of the regulator and other independents. The sets of independent harvesters and co-op 
joiners are denoted I (independents) and J (joiners) and their respective numbers are 
and . The regulator assigns portions of the stock to each group in proportion to these 
numbers and in such a way that one group’s harvest opportunities are unaffected by the actions of 
the other group.
) (I n ) (J n
Z
18 The separate stock assignments are denoted ZI and ZJ, the separate TAC 
assignments are I β and J Z β , and the regulator constrains each group’s fishing times according 
to (3) to meet these TAC assignments. We assume cost parameters are such that each firm is 
capable of earning positive profit by fishing independently, regardless of the composition of the 
independent and co-op fleets.
19 The initial joining decision and subsequent decisions on effort 
deployment are modeled as a two-stage entry game. Subgame perfect Nash equilibria are 
identified by backward induction. 
 
Stage 2 choices by the co-op 
  The co-op’s manager is motivated to maximize total co-op profit and the co-op’s total 
catch is fixed by the regulator. Consequently, the co-op’s optimal policy solves the following cost 
minimization problem: 
 
  ( ) J
J i
i i i i
J i
J i
x J i T d
x T T x G d
J i i
+ + − + ∑ ∑
∈ ∈ ∈




subject to } , 0 { d di ∈ , ] , 0 [ T Ti ∈  for all J i∈ , and a regulatory constraint on members’ fishing 
times set according to (3).  is the co-op’s expenditure on the public input.  J x
                                                 
18 The possibility of partitioning a stock in this fashion depends on the behavior of the target species. We 
examine a migrating species, sockeye salmon. In practice the regulator partitioned the stock between the 
two harvester groups by specifying different season openings and closures for each. As a consequence the 
two groups could operate on separate portions of the overall run without interfering with one another. A 
spatial division may achieve this result for a sedentary species.  
19 This is consistent with the presence of positive license values under purely independent fishing in the 
fishery we examine empirically. 
  8The co-op’s optimal policy is straightforward.
20 First, it sets 0 = i d for each member. This 
is obvious because (4) is non-decreasing in the di for each member and strictly increasing in di for 
any member who spends positive time fishing. Second, the co-op’s policy assigns positive harvest 
times to a subset of members who have low values of the ratio i i γ φ and limits the number who 
actually fish so that the co-op’s season lasts the entire time fish are available, T .
21 Other co-op 
members do not fish at all. The intuition for this result is as follows. Since  i φ  and i γ are i’s cost 
per unit time and effort per unit time, respectively, the ratio i i γ φ is i's cost per unit effort, so it is 
sensible to concentrate effort among low i i γ φ members. By slowing the rate of fishing and 
making its season last as long as possible, the co-op concentrates effort among these efficient 
members to the greatest extent possible. Third, the co-op’s public input provision satisfies 
 
  , (5)  1 ) ( ) (
1 ≤ ′
−
J J Z F x G β
 
where  and (5) holds with equality if  .This is a Samuelson condition for optimal 
provision of a public good.  
0 ≥ J x 0 > J x
These results are summarized as 
Proposition 1 The co-op’s policy requires that: 
(i)  All active co-op members fish as close to port as possible; 
(ii)  Only members with low cost per unit effort( ) i i γ φ  apply effort, these efficient 
members fish the entire time the season is open, and the season is open for T  
periods, the entire time the stock is available; 
(iii)  Provision of the public input equates the co-op’s aggregate marginal benefit from 
provision to marginal cost, satisfying a Samuelson efficiency condition. 
Proof:  See text and the Appendix. 
 
Stage 2 choices by independents 
  The independent fleet’s catch per unit effort at any location d depends on the effort levels 
and locations of all independents. We denote catch per unit effort 
                                                 
20 The assumption that any co-op member could have earned positive profit from fishing as an independent 
implies that the co-op’s maximal profit is necessarily positive. By joining the co-op, each member avoids 
any cost associated with fishing outside and benefits from the public input.  
21 See the Appendix. 
  9by ( I i i i Z I i T d d H , , , , ; ∈ ) γ and assume each independent takes it as given.
22 Independent h’s 
profit when the set I fishes independently is 
 
  h h h h h i I i h h h I i i i h h x T T x G d T Z I i T d d H − − Σ − + − ∈ =
∈ φ γ α γ γ π )) ( ( ) , , , , ; ( .  (6) 
 
Independent h’s profit is linear in Th and, by assumption, maximal profit is positive. Firm h’s 
maximal profit is therefore increasing in Th. This implies I h T T = for all  , i.e., all 
independents fish the entire time their season is open. 
I h∈
 Independent  h’s optimal public input contribution satisfies the first-order condition 
 
  1 ) ( ≤ Σ ′
∈ I h i J i T x G γ ,  (7) 
 
where  and (7) holds with strict equality if  . The left-hand and right-hand sides of (7) 
are h’s private marginal benefit and marginal cost for contributing. Let i
* be the independent with 
the highest γ among all independents; the private marginal benefit of contributing is greatest for 
this independent. Assuming individual fishermens’ γ parameters are distinct, if
0 ≥ h x 0 > h x
1 ) 0 ( > ′ ∗ I i T G γ  
then the unique Nash equilibrium requires this harvester and only this harvester to make a 
contribution;  i
*’s contribution in this case satisfies (7) with equality.
23 Alternatively, 
ifG 1 0 ( ′ ) ≤ ∗ I i T γ then each independent fisherman’s optimal contribution is zero. In either case, it 
is clear (and unsurprising) that independents under-provide the public input. 
 
                                                 
22 The number of independents is assumed sufficiently large that each individual ignores the effect of 
his/her effort level on the group’s catch per unit effort. 
23 Given that (7) is satisfied with equality for independent i
*, the inequality must be strict for all other 
independents, implying that their optimal contribution is zero. This is a standard free-rider equilibrium.  
  10 
The choice of fishing distance can be examined using the marginal and average catch-
effort functions, and () ) / ( / , Z E F E Q Z E M ′ = ∂ ∂ ≡ ( ) ) / /( ) / ( / , Z E Z E F E Q Z E A = ≡ . The 
shapes of theses functions, shown in Fig. 2, are determined by the monotonicity and concavity 
of . To meet the catch target, the regulator fixes total independent effort according to (3), at a 




A() Z I, κ , regardless of whether all fish inside or outside.
 24 Suppose independent h 
chooses to fish inside while all other independents fish outside. In this case h encounters the stock 
after other independents have fished and obtains the marginal (rather than average) catch per unit 
effort from I κ units of effort,  . Alternatively, if h fishes outside while all other 
independents fish inside, h’s catch per unit effort would be
) ( I M κ
( ) in  1 M Fig. 2, the marginal catch from 
the first unit of effort.
25 
If all independents are fishing outside, any individual who deviates to the inside would 
find that cost per unit effort falls byd , but catch per unit effort falls by ) ( ) ( I I M A κ κ − . If 
d M A I I ) ( ) ( > − κ κ  , which we refer to as Condition (i), then no independent will find it 
profitable to deviate inside.
26 If Condition (i) holds, which is more likely whend is small, the 
Nash equilibrium strategy profile in this subgame is unique and requires that all I κ units of effort 
fish outside. Suppose, instead, that all independents are fishing inside. In this case any individual 
                                                 
24 We henceforth suppress the second argument in A(
.) and M(
.), since it remains unchanged. 
25 Fisherman h’s catch equals h’s catch per unit effort times the effort h applies, γhTI. Catches from the 
same location will therefore differ among fishermen in proportion to their γ parameters. 
26 The common cost term
I hT φ , which appears in both profit comparisons, has been ignored. 
Independent effort, E 
() I A κ
Fig. 2. Independent fisherman h’s catch per unit effort, 
depending on where other independents fish 
I κ 1 
( ) Z E A ,
() I M κ
( Z E M ,
() 1 M
)
  11who deviates outside will find that cost per unit effort increases byd , but catch per unit effort 
increases by  ) ( ) 1 ( I A M κ − . If  d A M I < − ) ( ) 1 ( κ , which we refer to as Condition (ii), then no 
independent will find it profitable to deviate outside. If Condition (ii) holds, which is more likely 
whend is large, a Nash equilibrium in this subgame is unique and requires that all I κ units of 
effort fish inside.  
Finally, suppose ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) I I I A M d M κ κ − ≤ ≤ − ( A κ so neither condition holds. This 
implies that a Nash equilibrium strategy profile for the second stage subgame cannot have all 
effort fishing either inside or outside. We illustrate this case in Fig. 3. The horizontal axis now 
indicates outside effort and the dashed line d E A − ) (  shows outsider profit per unit effort. To 
characterize Nash equilibrium choices of distance, suppose all independent effort was initially 
fishing outside and successive units were transferred inside. The first unit transferred inside 
would earn profit ) ( I M κ , shown by point c, which exceeds the profit from fishing outside. 
Transferring successive effort units inside causes insider profit per unit effort to increase toward 
point a, at which point all effort is fishing inside and profit per unit effort equals ) I ( A κ . The dot-
dash line labeled ‘insider profit’ traces out one possible locus of insider profits.
27 IfE ˆ  units of 
effort fish outside and all others fish inside so all earn equal profit, no one has an incentive to 
deviate.
28 Accordingly, a Nash equilibrium strategy profile in this case is described by this 




                                                 
27 It can be shown that the dot-dash line is monotone and continuous. 
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Fig. 3. A NE strategy profile in which some independents 
fish outside while others fish inside. 
  12 
We summarize these results as 
Proposition 2 In the subgame involving the independent sector’s choice of time spent fishing, 
public input contributions, and fishing locations, a Nash equilibrium strategy profile requires that: 
(i)  Each independent harvester fishes the entire time the regulator leaves the 
independents’ season open; 
(ii)  The independent sector under-provides the public input relative to what is efficient; 
(iii)  All independents fish outside if d M A I I > − ) ( ) ( κ κ , fish inside if 
d A M I < − ) ( ) 1 ( κ and are split between fishing inside and fishing outside 
if ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( I I I A M d M A κ κ κ − ≤ ≤ − .  
Proof: See Figs. 2 and 3 and the preceding discussion.  
We also note that the TAC constraint (3) and the regulator’s stock assignment, 
) ( ) ( K n I n Z ZI = , imply that the independent sector’s season length equals 
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and is therefore inversely proportional to the group’s average skill, a result that will become 
useful later. 
 
The Stage 1 decision of whether or not to join  
  We adopt the convention that fishermen are indexed in increasing order of their γ terms, 
so low skill fishermen have low index numbers. To obtain a clear identification on the attributes 
of co-op joiners, we assume that high skill harvesters (high γ) have low cost per unit effort 
(low γ φ ). This will be true if the φ terms are constant, if φ and γ are inversely ordered, or if φ 
does not increase more than proportionately as γ increases.  
  We start by examining the second stage profit shares of successive co-ops in which new 
members are added in order of their γ parameters and demonstrate that larger co-ops (formed in 
this fashion) necessarily have higher profit per member. Writing out the co-op’s profit share 
equation and incorporating its optimal policy choices and the regulator’s TAC assignment yields 
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  13where indicates the set of co-op members selected to fish and  is the co-op’s optimal public 
input contribution. The rhs consists of three components. The first is catch per member minus the 
common cost term involving a. Given the TAC allocation formula, this does not depend on co-op 
size. The second component is the co-op’s maximal net public good benefit per member. As 
shown in the Appendix, it necessarily is increasing in . The third component is the 
opportunity cost of time spent fishing divided by the number of co-op members; it decreases with 
co-op size for the following reason. If a new member is added the TAC allocation rule causes a 
proportionate increase in the co-op’s effort, so effort per member remains unchanged. 
Consequently, the effect of a new member on the third component in (9) coincides with the new 
member’s effect on the co-op’s average time cost per unit effort. Given the order in which 





) ( γ φ  is necessarily less than that 
of existing members. Therefore, the new member will be designated to fish and the co-op’s 
average time cost per unit effort falls.  
Taken together these results imply that co-op profit per member increases with co-op 
size, as illustrated by the upward sloping line ) (γ πC in Fig. 4.
29 The positive co-op profit shown 
for the lowest skill level follows from the assumption that all fishermen could earn positive profit 
by fishing independently, plus the fact that (i) a one member co-op would receive its own TAC 
allocation and thereby avoid fishing outside and (ii) its allocation exceeds what the least skilled 
harvester would catch as an independent. This reasoning also implies that a 1 member co-op’s 
profit exceeds what the same fisherman could earn by fishing independently with all other 
harvesters, a result that is useful shortly.   
 
                                                 
29 This solid line is a smooth curve connecting a set of discrete points indicating the per member profits for 
co-ops of different sizes. 
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  Next, we examine the profit of the marginal (least profitable) co-op member in a 
sequence of independent fleets formed by successively adding lower skilled harvesters and 
demonstrate that the marginal independent’s profit necessarily falls as the size of the independent 
fleet grows. To simplify, we assume the independent fleet’s equilibrium public input provision is 
0, which is always approximately true. We also make use of the convention  and the fact 
that catch per unit effort equals
0 ) 0 ( = G
) ( 1 / β β − F due to the TAC constraint. Incorporating these 
simplifications in (6), independent harvester h’s profit in the case where all independents fish 
outside is  
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  Our earlier assumption implies that γ φ falls as γ increases, so independents with higher 
skill parameters have higher profits. The marginal (least profitable) independent in any group is 
therefore the one with the lowest γ and forming a sequence of independent fleets by successively 
adding lower skill fishermen causes marginal profit to decline. The same conclusion applies in 
the case where all independents fish inside because h’s profit in this instance is found by 
replacing the constant d in (10) by zero. This result also extends to the case where some 
independents fish inside and others fish outside because equilibrium in the second stage requires 
Size of co-op (fishermen ordered by γ) 
) ( i m π γ
Profit 
Fig. 4. Equilibrium co-op size 
C π ˆ
) ( i C γ π
e  e+1  ) (K n 1 
  15that each independent earns the same profit per unit effort at either location. This implies that the 
inside vs. outside differential in catch per unit effort exactly matches the differential in cost per 
unit effort, d , so once again independents with higher skill parameters have higher profits.
30  
  The dashed line ) ( i m γ π in Fig. 4 illustrates the marginal profit in a group of independent 
fishermen who have efficiency parameters greater than or equal to a given level γι. The left 
vertical intercept of ) ( i m γ π lies below the ) ( i C γ π intercept because, as explained earlier, a 1 
member co-op’s profit exceeds what the same fisherman could earn by fishing independently 
with all other harvesters. The right vertical intercept of  ) ( i m γ π is shown to lie above the 
corresponding intercept for the co-op, indicating that the highest skilled fisherman could earn 
more by fishing as a lone independent than by joining an all-inclusive co-op, but this is not the 
only possibility. If both conditions on intercepts are met then ) i ( m γ π must cross ) ( i C γ π from 
below at least once.  
  Such a crossing point identifies a threshold skill level that separates co-op joiners from 
independents. In Fig. 4 the threshold is index value e, referring to a fisherman with skill level e γ . 
If all harvesters with skill less than or equal to  e γ  are in the co-op then: (i) all those in the co-op 
earn  ) ( e C γ π , which exceeds that they would earn by fishing independently, and (ii) all 
those who fish independently earn more than they would in the co-op since 
e i e m > ∀ ) ( C i > ( ) γ π γ π .
31 This allocation of fishermen to groups, together with Nash equilibrium 
strategy profiles in stage 2, is therefore a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If ) ( i m γ π lies 
entirely below ) ( i C γ π , the allocation in which all harvesters join the co-op is the only Nash 
equilibrium. If the two curves cross more than once, there is an equilibrium for each occasion 
where ) ( i m γ π crosses ) ( i C γ π  from below. The generic Stage 1 prediction, that high γ fishermen 
choose to fish independently, is not surprising; by definition, highliners compete most 
successfully in the race to fish and joining the co-op would necessitate sharing their harvest 
profits with less skilled fishermen.
32 
                                                 
30 The d F − − − α β β ) ( 1  term is replaced by one of two expressions in this case, depending on whether the 
individual involved fishes inside or outside, but these two expressions take on the same value. 
31 We assume a fisherman joins the co-op if profits from the two choices are equal. The condition stated in 
the text is equivalent to the internal and external stability conditions for cartel formation developed by d’ 
Aspremont, et al. (1983). 
32 We have not demonstrated that increases monotonically. As the independent fleet’s average skill 
level increases the season length falls, which works against the profit increase from greater skill. 
) ( i m γ π
  16  Key results on the joining decision are summarized as: 
Proposition 3 Under our assumption on the relationship between effort rate and time cost 
parameters, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy profile has the following properties: 
(i)  The group choosing to fish independently consists of highliners; more precisely, all 
independents have skill levels greater than any co-op member; 
(ii)  The choices of distance, fishing time and public input contributions are described by 
Propositions 1 and 2. 
 
Characterizing Pareto-improving catch allocations  
  The above discussion characterizes the membership and economic behavior of 
heterogeneous fishermen composing the two fleets.  Here we identify conditions under which 
allowing formation of the self-selected cooperative is Pareto improving. 
  The answer hinges on the allocation of catch between the two sectors.  We have assumed 
thus far that the regulator assigns catch in proportion to membership:  ) ( ) ( K n J n Z Z J = .  To 
explore this issue more completely, we generalize this notion to allow for disproportionate 
assignments:  ) ( ) ( K n J n Z Z J θ = where the scalar θ controls the proportional assignment to the 
cooperative sector.   For example, if θ=0.9 then the cooperative is assigned a stock allocation that 
provides nine-tenths of a per capita share for each co-op joiner.  Intuitively, it would seem that 
cooperative members would be advantaged and independents disadvantaged by larger values of θ, 
but the endogeneity of self-selected membership may blur this intuition.  We start by deriving the 
profit for an arbitrary fisherman, h, in a ‘completely independent fishery’, a term we use to refer 
to the counterfactual situation where no co-op is allowed to form. We then compare this profit to 
what h would earn when the cooperative is allowed to form.  Naturally, we simultaneously solve 
for whether fisherman h fishes independently or as a member of the cooperative fleet. 
  In a completely independent fishery (i.e. if the co-op were not allowed for form), h would 
earn the following profit from independent fishing: 
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  When the voluntary cooperative is allowed to form, h’s profit depends on whether he/she 
decides to join or to fish independently.  Suppose h chooses to fish in the independent fleet. The 
resulting profit is: 
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Here, TI is the season length for the independent fleet, given by  . The stock 



















) 1 ( θ θ .  Fisherman h 
gains from the co-op’s formation if  h h π π < ~ , and loses if h h π π > ~ , which clearly depends on the 
allocation parameter θ.  Setting the right-hand sides of equations (11) and (12) equal, we can 
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where J is the set who would join.
33 The rhs of (13) is the ratio of average skill for those who 
would join to the average skill of all fishermen. By Proposition 3, joiners have below-average 
skill, so 1 < c θ .   Those who would choose to fish as independents are disadvantaged by allowing 
the co-op to form if  c θ θ > and they are advantaged if c θ θ < .  
  Next, consider the fate of those who opt to join the cooperative if it is allowed to form. 
Proposition 3 indicates that these individuals are apt to be the lower skilled members of the fleet.  
Because they coordinate on fishing location and public goods provision (both of which lower 
costs) their calculus is somewhat different, but it still hinges on how θ compares to c θ . 
 If c θ θ >
c
, the most skilled members of the cooperative are actually disadvantaged by the 
fact that it forms.  Consider the most highly skilled joiner.  In the limit, if the number of 
fishermen is large this individual earns the same profit as the least skilled independent.  We 
established above that all independents are strictly worse off in the presence of the cooperative 
when θ θ > , so the same is true for the highest skill joiner. 
                                                 
33 In a situation where all are fishing the same amount of time per season, as was the case with independent 
fishing before the co-op was allowed to form, this ratio would equal the ratio of average catches for co-op 
joiners to the average catch for the entire fleet. It follows that the critical parameter θc can be estimated 
from information on average catch shares of joiners and independents in a pre-co-op period. 
  18  We next show that if c θ θ = , a cooperative still forms and all who join are made better 
off by the opportunity to join.  A sufficient condition for the formation of a cooperative is that the 
lowest-skill fisherman can earn higher profit by forming a one-person cooperative than by fishing 
in a completely independent fishery.  Revenue in the two situations is the same 
when c θ θ = because a one person cooperative’s catch allocation equals what the individual 
would have caught by completely independent fishing. Cost for the one person cooperative is 
lower than with independent fishing, however, because the cooperative coordinates on fishing 
location; so this individual would benefit by forming a one-person co-op.  How does the highest 
skill joiner in a multi-person co-op fare?  Given the decision to join, this person’s profit as a co-
op member is at least as great as what he/she could have earned by opting into the independent 
fleet. In turn, since c θ θ = the profit that would have been earned by choosing to fish as an 
independent equals what this individual would have earned in a completely independent fishery. 
Thus, all joiners are at least weakly advantaged by the ability to join a cooperative. 
 Finally,  if  c θ θ <  a cooperative may or may not form.  Clearly, if θ is sufficiently near 
zero the loss from a low catch allocation more than offsets the gains from coordination for a co-
op of any size, so no co-op will form. Let c L θ θ <  be the lowest value of θ for which a 
cooperative of some size will form. Then for θ values in the interval  c L θ θ θ < ≤  a cooperative 
forms and all fishermen, including independents and joiners, benefit from its formation.  To see 
this, first note that if the independent fleet contains N(I) fishers, then even the least skilled of 
these individuals is advantaged by co-op’s formation because an allocation satisfying 
c θ θ < advantages those who opt into the independent fleet.  Next, consider the highest skilled 
joiner. Given the decision to join, the individual’s co-op profit necessarily exceeds what he/she 
could have earned by opting into the independent fleet. This potential independent fleet profit, in 
turn, necessarily exceeds what he/she would have earned in a completely independent fishery 
because c θ θ < . Therefore the highest skilled joiner is better off from the co-op’s formation. All 
lower-skilled joiners earn the same profit as the highest skilled joiner and would have earned less 
in a completely independent fishery, so they are all advantaged as well.  We summarize all of 
these findings in the following proposition: 
Proposition 4 The formation of a self-selected cooperative has the following distributional 
consequences: 
  19(i)  If c L θ θ θ ≤ ≤ the institutional design is Pareto improving – fishermen of all skill 
levels are made weakly better off by allowing the cooperative to form. 
(ii)  If c θ θ > the institutional design is not Pareto improving – all would-be independents 
and some would-be cooperative fishermen are made worse off by allowing the 
cooperative to form. 
(iii)  If  L θ θ < then no cooperative forms. 
 
 
3. Empirical Evidence 
 
We test the model’s predictions with data from the Chignik sockeye salmon fishery and 
neighboring fisheries. Chignik is one of Alaska’s oldest commercial salmon fisheries, dating to 
the 1880s. Prior to 2002 approximately 100 independent purse seine permit holders competed for 
a share of a fishery-wide limit on allowed catch, which was enforced by closing the season when 
the target was met.
34 In 2002 the Alaska Board of Fisheries approved a request by a group of 
permit holders to form annual cooperatives for voluntary joiners and this arrangement continued 
through 2004.
35 The number of fishermen who joined ranged from 77 in 2002 and 2003 to 87 in 
2004, with the total number of permits equaling 100 throughout the period. Shortly before the 
2005 fishing season, the Alaska Supreme Court shut down the co-op ruling that it violated an 
Alaska law prohibiting permit holders who did not actively fish from accruing fishery profits.
36 
This history generated three distinct periods that we exploit in our empirical models – the years 
before the co-op,  the co-op years, and the years after the co-op was shut down.  The fact that the 
co-op treatment “switch” was turned on, and then off, helps us isolate the casual effects of the 
cooperative from fishery specific time trends (Meyer 1995, p. 158), and it helps eliminate serial 
correlation in our panel regression models (Bertrand et. al. 2004, p. 251). 
                                                 
34 Purse seine fishing uses a large net that cinches from the bottom to prevent schools of fish from escaping. 
The Appendix shows maps of the Chignik fishing area. 
35 The co-op’s proposal explained the motivation for forming the cooperative as follows: “The current 
fishing fleet is overcapitalized and the competitive harvest system does not allow for real improvements in 
produc[t] quality or flexibility in competing with farmed salmon” (Grunert v. State 2005, p. 927). 
36 A constrained version of the co-op was allowed to operate during 2005. The constraint required all co-op 
members to spend time at sea aboard fishing vessels (Stichert 2007). Because our model implies that this 
requirement eliminated the main efficiency gains of the co-op, we consider 2004 to be the final year of co-
op operation. 
 
  20The model in the preceding section essentially mirrors the fishery’s key physical 
attributes and its actual mode of operation. Regarding physical attributes, sockeye salmon migrate 
towards only one river in the Chignik system (Chignik R.) and are “funneled” toward that river as 
the migration extends from open ocean, through Chignik Bay, into Chignik Lagoon, and finally 
into Chignik River. Processing facilities are located near the destination and the stock becomes 
more concentrated as it migrates. This generates a tension between the individual incentive to fish 
outside to contact the stock before others do, and the collective efficiency of harvesting inside 
near the stock’s ultimate destination.  
 Regarding the mode of operation, the co-op was allocated a share of the total allowable 
catch (TAC) each year to harvest as it saw fit, with the remainder designated for traditional, 
competitive harvest by the independent sector. Each co-op joiner signed a 1-year contract before 
fishing began, agreeing that the cooperative would manage his/her fishing effort for the coming 
season. The two sectors fished at different times, determined by the regulator, and each sector’s 
season was closed when its TAC share was reached. Each year the co-op’s TAC share was 
determined by the following rule: (i) if less than 85 percent of permit holders joined, the co-op 
received an allocation equal to nine-tenths of a per capita share for each joiner; and (ii) if 85 
percent or more of permit holders joined, the co-op received a full per capita share for each 
joiner. In terms of the model, these two allocations correspond to 9 . 0 = θ and 0 . 1 = θ , 
respectively. Further, there is significant variation in fishermen’s skill levels as measured by 
share of catch history in years prior to the co-op, indicating the potential for an interior solution 
where some elect to join the cooperative while others remain independent. 
Two features not specifically addressed by our model imply that the co-op’s formation 
could affect price. The first is the presence of monopsony power in Chignik under traditional, 
non-cooperative fishing – with 100 fishermen, and only one or two processors in the period we 
study. It is widely believed that processors extract most of the rents from negotiation with 
independent fishermen; presumably, a coordinated harvester group could wield its own market 
power.  The second is a potential price premium for higher quality product; indeed, the possibility 
of exercising greater care in harvesting in order to deliver a higher quality product was prominent 
in initial discussions on forming a co-op. Both considerations indicate that the co-op’s formation 
might lead to higher prices to co-op fishermen.
37 
                                                 
37 We chose not to incorporate the market power feature explicitly in the model, in part because its effect 
seems obvious and in part because this seems specific to Chignik and not a feature of common pool 
resources more generally. The co-op’s incentive to coordinate to guarantee higher product quality is similar 
to its incentive to provide club goods, and in that sense is consistent with our model. The difference is that 
enhanced product quality raises price, while we treat the effect of club goods as decreasing costs. 
  21 
Allocation of Fishing Effort 
  Perhaps the most compelling reason to form a cooperative in Chignik was to reduce the 
number of vessels actually fishing (Prop.1.ii), in order to catch its TAC allocation (which 
depended on membership) more efficiently.  Thus, we expect the proportion of permits actually 
fished to decline during 2002-2004. Figure 5 compares the proportion of permits actively fished 
in Chignik to the proportion fished across five adjacent purse seine fisheries for years before, 
during and after the co-op.
38  As the figure shows, the proportion of permits actively fished in 
Chignik fell from 0.94 in 2001 to 0.41 in 2002 when the co-op first operated, and then increased 
after the co-op was effectively dissolved in 2005.
39 The darkest bars show the difference between 
Chignik and the average across the control-group fisheries. This difference was strictly positive 
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38 The adjacent fisheries are Alaska Peninsula, Cook Inlet, Kodiak, Prince William Sound, and Southeast 
Alaska.  
39 The spike up to 0.98 in 2005 is worth explaining. In early 2005, shortly before the start of the fishing 
season and after the co-op was already formed for the 2005 harvest, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that 
the co-op violated an Alaska law prohibiting permit holders who did not actively fish from accruing profits. 
The state’s remedy for the 2005 season was to allow the co-op to fish but to require that all co-op members 
actively fish for a small part of the season.  In 2006, the co-op was entirely dissolved. We discuss the Court 
decision in more detail later. 
 
  22A complementary panel regression demonstrates that the visual evidence of the co-op 
effect is robust to additional controls (Table 1). The panel regression employs 66 fishery-year 
observations, from 6 fisheries over 11 years (1998-2008). This time span allows four years of 
data before and after the co-op was active. The regression includes fishery fixed effects, as well 
as year fixed effects to control for annual variation in factors such as the prices of fuel and farm-
raised salmon. We also control for the fishery-wide TAC.  The result indicates that the co-op 
policy reduced the proportion of permits fished by nearly 0.27. The direction of the effect, a 
reduction, is consistent with expectations and the coefficient estimate is economically and 
statistically significant.
40 The result is particularly striking because it pertains to consolidation 
across the entire fishery. Consistent with our theory, annual Chignik Area management reports 
indicate that almost all of the consolidation occurred within the co-op; during 2002-2004 the 
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Fishery-Wide TAC  1.19e-07 
(0.29) 
Fixed Effects 
  Year Dummies  











Notes: (1) * Significant at 0.05 level for a one-tailed t-test. (2) Year dummies span 1998-2008. (3) 
The 5 control fisheries are the nearby purse seine fisheries: Alaska Peninsula, Cook Inlet, Kodiak, 
Prince William Sound, and Southeast.  
(4) Data are available at:  http://www.cfec.state.ak.us/research/salmon/salpmt98_07.pdf and 
http://www.cfec.state.ak.us/research/salmon/salpmt99_08.pdf. 
                                                 
40  To correct for possible serial correlation of errors within each fishery we conduct a robustness check 
recommended by Bertrand et. al. (2004).  We collapse the data into averages for each fishery during three 
time periods – before, during, and after the co-op years. We next run a panel regression using the 18 
observations (6 fisheries and 3 time periods) and include fishery and time period fixed effects along with 
the average fishery-wide TAC. This generates consistent standard error estimates (Bertrand et. al. 2004). In 
our case, the coefficient on Co-op Policy for the collapsed data is -0.271 with a t-statistic of 3.81.  
41 Members who fished on behalf of the co-op were paid salaries to compensate for their costs. All co-op 
members were then paid equal shares of the profit remaining after these salaries and other co-op costs were 
deducted; Knapp and Hill (2003). 
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The model further predicts that the co-op will coordinate on the location of harvest in 
order to reduce costs.  Because the co-op secures a guaranteed allocation of catch, co-op 
harvesters should wait until fish migrate inside, at which time the harvest will be more efficiently 
executed (Prop. 1.i).  In contrast, some or all of the independent sector’s harvest is expected to 
take place ‘outside’ (Prop. 2.iii). We use data on the spatial location of catch to test these 
propositions in two different ways. First, we examine fishery-wide annual time-series data to see 
how the proportion of sockeye caught inside deviated during 2002-2004 from longer annual time 
trends. We then use within-fishery cross-section data to assess how the proportion of ‘inside’ 
catch differed between co-op and independent fishermen during 2002-2004. Our measure of 
location is the annual proportion caught in Chignik Lagoon (see Fig. A2), the ‘inside’ location.  
Figure 6
Proportion of Chignik Area Sockeye TAC Caught 'Inside'












Figure 6 shows the fishery-wide proportion of sockeye caught ‘inside’ over a 10 year 
period that includes 2002-2004, the co-op’s years of operation, and indicates that the proportion 
caught ‘inside’ peaked during the co-op years.  The time-series regression model in Column 1 of 
Table 2 uses annual data on the inside catch proportion for 1970-2007, the entire period for which 
data are available. It accounts for the cyclical nature of the time-series data by including a 4
th-
order polynomial time trend and controls for variation in harvest by including a 4
th-order 
polynomial in the annual allowed catch. Allowing the cooperative to form apparently increased 
the proportion caught inside by 0.27, which presumably reduced costs. Note that this proportion 
applies to the entire fishery, including both co-op fishermen and independents.  
  24 
Table 2 
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Notes: (1) * Significant at 0.05 level for a one-tailed t-test (2) The data used here come from 
Chignik area annual management reports. Column 1 uses available data for 1970-2007. Column 2 
uses available data for 1980-2006. We lack data on season length prior to 1980 and the 2007 data 
are not yet published. 
 
   Table 3 compares the location choices of co-op and independent fleets during 2002-2004. 
As the model predicts, the co-op harvested its entire allocation inside Chignik Lagoon in each 
year.
42 By comparison, the independent fleet harvested from both inside and outside in 2002 and 
2003, which is consistent with the possibility of a mixed equilibrium. During 2004 when there 
were only 13 independents, all independent harvest took place inside the lagoon.  
 
                                                 
42 The following account from a co-op founder makes clear that fishing inside was a conscious operating 
policy: “We had originally planned to employ a couple of large … seiners to fish out on the capes [outside], 
but we realized that the extra running time would increase costs and reduce product quality. Harvesting in 
the close proximity and concentrated harvest area of the Chignik Lagoon [inside] was simply the most 
efficient and quality conscious method to pursue.” (Ross 2002a). 
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Table 3 
Proportion of Sockeye Caught Inside by Co-op and Independent Fleets 
(on days reserved exclusively for one of the two fleets) 
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The model also predicts that the co-op’s policy will result in a longer fishing season.  
Prop.1.ii indicates that the cooperative’s allocation will be harvested by a subset of its most 
efficient members.  In order to make maximal use of its most efficient harvesters the co-op limits 
the number of members who actually fish, which slows the rate of fishing and lengthens its 
season. By contrast, all independents are predicted to fish each day their season is open, causing 
the regulator to shorten the season in order to meet the TAC constraint. 
We test the season length prediction using time-series data for Chignik, employing the 
same strategy used to examine the proportion of catch from inside. Column 2 of Table 2 uses 
annual data from the available years, 1980-2006, on the total number of days sockeye salmon 
fishing occurred at Chignik. The regression estimates indicate that, on average, the presence of 
the co-op lengthened the season by 32 days, a 48 percent increase in season length from the long 
run average of 66 days in non co-op years.
43 
We noted earlier the co-op’s potential to raise price by delivering higher quality fish or 
by exercising increased market power in negotiations with processors. We cannot separate these 
two effects, but we can test for a price increase using a panel-regression model with the same 
controls as Table 1. The results (Table 4) indicate that formation of the co-op was accompanied 
by an average price increase of $0.21 per pound in the Chignik fishery (in 2008 dollars). This 
represents a 27.6 percent increase from the Chignik average of $0.76 outside of the co-op years.
 44 
                                                 
43  Our theory predicts that the co-op’s practice of fishing only a small fraction of its permits will 
necessarily result in longer season lengths.  The regulator’s policy of splitting the season into separate 
openings could also increase season lengths.  
44  The price data are inflation adjusted and are in 2008 dollars. As before we estimated a version of the 
regression in Table 4 by collapsing the data into averages for each fishery during three time periods – 
  26Note that this is a lower-bound estimate of any price premium the co-op achieved because nearly 





Panel Regression of Gross Earnings Per Pound 




















Fishery-Wide TAC   -1.17e-06* 
(2.14) 
Fixed Effects 
  Year Dummies  











Notes: (1) * Significant at 0.05 level for a one-tailed t-test. (2) Year and fishery dummies are as in 
Table 1. (3) The gross earnings data are adjusted by the CPI and are presented in 2008 dollars. (4) 
Data are available at: http://www.cfec.state.ak.us/research/salmon/salpmt98_07.pdf and 
http://www.cfec.state.ak.us/research/salmon/salpmt99_08.pdf. 
 
Public Input Provision 
Our evidence on provision of shared or public inputs by the co-op is anecdotal, gleaned 
from trade press accounts and annual management reports of the Alaska Department of Fish and 
Game (ADFG). The most prominent shared inputs installed by the co-op were ‘fixed leads’, 
stationary nets placed along the fish migration route to funnel the stock toward waiting purse 
seiners.
46 The fixed leads altered the style of fishing and dramatically reduced the number of 
vessels required to achieve a given catch. This sort of shared infrastructure was not employed by 
the independent fleet.
47  
Other actions we characterize as public good provision by the co-op amount to very 
precise coordination of members’ actions. An important form of coordination was a finely tuned 
                                                                                                                                                 
before the co-op years, during the co-op years, and after the co-op years. This approach generates 
consistent standard error estimates (Bertrand et. al. 2004). The resulting coefficient on the Co-op Policy for 
the collapsed data is 0.211 with a t-statistic of 2.16.  
45 We lack cross-section data during 2002-2004 that would allow us to compare output prices between the 
co-op and independent sectors. 
46 See Pappas and Clark (2003). 
47 Ross (2002a). 
  27temporal allocation of its members’ effort (Stichert, 2007). During low tides in Chignik Lagoon, 
the inside location where the co-op harvested, shrinks to a fraction of its size at high water. This 
concentrates the fish and reduces harvest cost. A prominent co-op member described how this 
strategy worked: 
“Instead of [a co-op member] making four or five sets … during the flood [high tide] for 
200 to 300 [fish] a haul, he now could wait till the Lagoon drained out. At low tide … 
[the channel] became a slow, meandering river of concentrated sockeye. And now, 
fishing for the entire co-op, he could make one giant drag for 3,000 to 5,000 fish.
48 
This strategy required that co-op harvesters allow fish to escape up river during high tides, even 
though it is legal to catch them. Given the co-op’s secure catch allocation and its ability to 
coordinate, however, the incentive to do this was present.  We know of no instances of 
independent fishermen intentionally allowing fish to swim up river.   
The co-op also coordinated its members’ actions to improve the quality of fish delivered 
to processors. It received permits to hold live fish in net pens for up to three days, which allowed 
it to better match deliveries to processing capacity. On occasion, the co-op even released live fish 
from capture when processing capacity was insufficient.
49 Independent harvesters have no 
incentive to engage in such practices and we are aware of no evidence indicating that they did. 
The co-op also coordinated information on stock locations from all of its active members and 
used this information to dispatch vessels and crews to the most advantageous locations. We are 
aware of no evidence that the independent fleet followed this practice; indeed, fishermen are 
notorious for hiding such information from their competitors. 
Finally, the fishery manager also benefited from the co-op’s ability to coordinate, by 
enabling precise control of a day’s catch in ways that cannot be accomplished with independent 
fishing. With independent fishing the fishery manager must forecast the rate of catch and 
announce a closing time calculated to meet the overall catch target, an imprecise process at best. 
On days the co-op fished, the manager could hit the target precisely, simply by requesting that the 
co-op cease fishing when the desired number of fish was caught (Pappas and Clark, 2003). 
 
Who Joined and Who Fished for the Co-op? 
Our model addresses these two key questions and yields the following predictions: 
highliners will remain independent while less-skilled fishermen will opt into the co-op (Prop.3.i) 
                                                 
48 Ross (December 2002). 
49 The preceding two examples are from: Mark A. Stichert, 2004 Chignik Management Area Annual 
Management Report. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, at: 
http://www.sf.adfg.state.ak.us/FedAidPDFs/fmr07-15.pdf. (2007) 
  28and the co-op will deploy its highest skilled members to fish on behalf of the entire enterprise 
(Prop.1.ii). Our model suggests that historic catch is a good proxy for the critical skill parameter, 
γ, so we test these predictions with data on catch shares during the pre-co-op period.   
While individual catch shares are not disclosed due Alaska confidentiality laws, we were 
able to obtain catch share data aggregated to the three firm level.
50 The procedure for carrying out 
these aggregations was designed to minimize catch share heterogeneity among the observations 
that were grouped. Because some harvesters changed status during the co-op period, different 
aggregations were formed, using the same procedure, for 2002, 2003 and 2004. For 2002 
aggregations, individual fishermen were first partitioned into three groups depending on their 
2002 co-op status: co-op joiners who fished, non-fishing co-op joiners and independents. All 
fishermen in a given group were ordered by average sockeye catch share over the historic 1995-
2001 period.
51 Successive fishermen were then clustered into groups of three and the average 
historic catch share within each cluster was reported to us. This procedure was then repeated for 
groups formed on the basis of 2003 and 2004 co-op status. The end result was a set of roughly 
100 observations on co-op status each year during 2002-2004 and average historic catch share 
(for 3-firm aggregates) during 1995-2001. We examine the model’s predictions both by testing 
for differences in mean historic catch shares across groups and by testing for stochastic 
dominance in the historic catch share distributions of different groups.
52  
Table 5 presents comparisons of mean historic catch shares. The first set of comparisons 
indicates that the mean historic catch share of those who fished independently during 2002-2004 
significantly exceeded that of co-op joiners (1.29 percent compared to 1.00 percent). The second 
                                                 
A
50 We are indebted to the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission for performing these 
aggregations for us. In a few cases it was necessary to aggregate over four firms. 
51 We do not consider more distant catch histories because vessel attributes and skill levels can change over 
time; we do not consider other salmon species because the co-op fished exclusively for sockeye. 
52 The premise underlying these empirical tests, that catch shares in the pre-co-op (historic) period are a 
good indicator of skill, deserves further discussion. The pre-cooperative period in the fishery corresponds 
to the independent sector’s second stage subgame where all fishers choose distance and fishing times 
independently and face a common season length. The model indicates that all permit holders will choose to 
fish the entire season in this circumstance. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, where all fish at the same 
distance, all obtain the same catch per unit effort and in this case the correspondence between skill and 
catch shares is precise. To see this, let
~
indicate catch per unit effort andT
~
the season length; fisherman 
i’s catch is then  T A i
~ ~
γ , which is proportional to i’s skill. In a mixed equilibrium, where some fish inside 
and some fish outside, the correspondence is not exact unless all fishermen split their fishing time between 
the two locations in the same proportion. This is true because inside effort achieves a lower catch per unit 
effort than outside effort. If skill were correlated with choice of location, historic catch shares would partly 
reflect location choices and not just skill. We see no reason for a correlation between skill and location 
choice correlation, however, because equilibrium profit per unit effort is the same at both locations. For this 
reason we regard historic catch share as an unbiased but possibly imprecise indicator of skill in the mixed 
equilibrium case. 
  29set indicates that the mean historic catch share of those who fished for the co-op exceeded the 





Comparison of Mean Catch Histories for Ranked and Sorted Clusters of Fishermen 
 
   
# of Obs. 
Mean  
Catch Share 
t-stat for diff. 
(abs. value) 
 




Independents 18  1.29  2.90* 
All co-op members 
 
Fishing vs. Non-fishing Co-op Joiners 
78 1.00   
Co-op members who fished  18  1.11  1.83* 
Co-op members who did not fish 
 
59 0.90   
Notes:  * statistically significant at 0.05 level for a one-tailed test. The data used here are pooled for 
2002-2004. 
 
Tests for first-order stochastic dominance in the empirical distribution functions also 
agree with predictions. Figure 7a plots the harvest share cumulative density functions for joiners 
and independents using the ranked and clustered data just described. From visual inspection, the 
empirical CDF for independents stochastically dominates that for joiners, i.e., the fraction of 
observations with catch share value less than or equal to a given value is greater for c-op joiners 
than for independents, for all observed catch share values. In Figure 7b we see that, except for a 
single exception near the right tail, the empirical CDF for co-op fishers stochastically dominates 
that for non-fishing co-op members. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests confirm that the differences in 
the CDFs are statistically significant by conventional standards.
53  
 
                                                 
53 The test results are available from the authors. 
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Figure 7a: CDF of 1995-2001 Catch share
For Co-op Joiners and Independents during 2002-2004
Independents Coop Joiners
Catch share










Figure 7b: CDF of 1995-2001 Catch share
For Joiners who Fished and joiners who did Not Fish during 2002-2004
Coop Fishers Coop Non-Fishers
catchshare








 Value of the Fishery 
  A remaining question is: how were profits in the fishery affected by allowing the co-op to 
form? We lack data on individual firm-level profits, but we do have data on the value of fishing 
permits. The value of a Chignik fishing permit should reflect the expected present value profit 
that a marginal (low skill) fisherman could earn in this fishery. The marginal fisherman’s profit is 
relevant, rather than the highliner’s profit, because (ignoring differences in non-pecuniary 
returns) the marginal fisherman would have the lowest reservation price for selling a permit, and 
would therefore determine the transaction price to potential buyers.  
  31Table 6 shows our estimate of the effect of the co-op policy on permit value using the 
same panel-regression model and controls used in Tables 1 and 4.  The result indicates that the 
co-op policy increased the value of a permit by $48,814 in 2008 dollars. This is a 26.3 percent 
increase relative to $185,806, which was the mean value of a Chignik permit over 1998 to 2008 
excluding the coop years.
54     
 
 
Table 6   
Panel Regression of Permit Value 
























  Year Dummies  











Notes: (1) * Significant at 0.05 level for a one-tailed t-test. (2) Year and fishery dummies are as in 
Table 1. (3) The permit value data are adjusted by the CPI and are presented in 2008 dollars. (4) 
Data are available at: http://www.cfec.state.ak.us/research/salmon/salpmt98_07.pdf and 
http://www.cfec.state.ak.us/research/salmon/salpmt99_08.pdf. 
 
We translate the permit value effect into an annual profit effect, as follows. The permit 
value difference in Table 6 presumably reflects the co-op’s effect on the present value of 
expected future profit for the marginal harvester. While it was operating, however, the co-op’s 
life span was unknown. We deal with this uncertainty by estimating a range of values for the 
implied annual profit effect, each based on a different assumption about the co-op’s expected life 
span. The lawsuit that eventually ended the co-op was filed in April 2002 (Grunert v. State 2005, 
p. 928), just before its first year of operation.  We therefore set the lower bound life expectancy at 
                                                 
54  As before we estimate a version of the regression in Table 6 by collapsing the data into averages for 
each fishery during three time periods – before the co-op years, during the co-op years, and after the co-op 
years. This approach generates consistent standard error estimates (Bertrand et. al. 2004). In our case, the 
coefficient on the Co-op Policy for the collapsed data is 49,024 with a t-statistic of 1.48.  
  323 years, its actual period of operation. We set the upper bound at infinity, corresponding to an 
expectation that it would persist in perpetuity.  
The estimated profit effect is calculated as follows. Let π indicate the expected annual 
profit before the co-op formed, and assume it is constant; let V indicate the pre-co-op license 
value and let r be the interest rate. Assuming license values observed before the co-op formed did 
not incorporate expected profits from the co-op’s possible formation, the preceding variables are 
linked by r V / π =
/( 1 1 { / − ⋅ V
. Let be the change in license value resulting from the co-op’s formation, 
which we estimate, and let T indicate the number of years the co-op was expected to operate. We 
wish to estimate the proportionate change in profit resulting from allowing the co-op to form, Φ. 
The appropriate present value formula gives . The term of 





1 1} ) 1 /( 1 1 { } / {
− + + − ⋅ Φ = Δ
T r r V π
1 } 1




Proportionate profit increase from allowing co-op to form 
 
Increase in license value  $48,814       
Baseline license value  $185,806       
Coop operating horizon (years)  3  5  10  ∞ 
Proportionate profit gain (Φ)  
(r=.10) 
0.83 0.60 0.40  0.26 
Proportionate profit gain (Φ) 
(r=.07) 
1.11 0.79 0.50  0.26 
 
Applying this formula to the data yields the results in Table 7. The lower-bound estimate 
of the annual gain in the marginal fisherman’s profit due to the co-op’s formation is 26 percent. If 
parties bidding for Chignik licenses thought the co-op would last for 5 years, the implied 
proportionate effect on annual profit is 60-79 percent and other entries in Table 7 have similar 
interpretations. 
 
Pareto Improvements, the TAC Allocation Rule and the Co-op Lawsuit   
Our empirical evidence on the question of Pareto improvements consists of data on the 
historic catch of co-op joiners and independents, the regulator’s TAC allocation rule and the 
lawsuit that challenged the co-op. Our model (Prop. 4i) indicates that dividing the TAC between 
  33the co-op and independent sectors in proportion to aggregate skill, corresponding to c θ θ = , 
would make those who choose to join the co-op better off and leave those who choose to fish as 
independents indifferent. This is a ‘knife-edge’ Pareto improvement, however; even a slight 
deviation from this TAC division that disfavors the independents ( c θ θ > ) would make all 
independents worse off, and presumably cause them to oppose the co-op’s formation.  
The allocation rule set forth when the co-op was first authorized (described at the 
beginning of this section) resulted in a TAC share for the co-op of 0.693 in 2002, its first year of 
operation. This share resulted from having 77 joiners and a nine-tenths per capita share ( 9 . 0 = θ ) 
for each ( ).  Our model indicates that historic, pre-co-op, catch is a natural 
measure of skill. The aggregate historic (1995-2001) catch share of those who chose to join in 
2002 was within 1 percentage point of the co-op’s assigned TAC share. 
693 . 9 . 0 77 = ×
Based on the model, therefore, it appears that this outcome and the essentially identical 
outcome in 2003 were right on the knife’s edge for a Pareto improvement. By 2004, however, the 
number of co-op joiners had increased from 77 to 87. To ensure a Pareto improving outcome as 
the size of the independent fleet declined, the TAC allocation granted for each independent 
permit holder would need to be increased (i.e. θ would need to decline). This is true because 
those leaving the independent sector to sign on with the co-op would be the least skilled 
independents (Prop. 3); hence, those remaining would be the most skilled independents. The 
actual allocation formula did just the opposite. Once the number of co-op members reached 85 in 
2004, the allocation rule reduced the independent sector’s TAC share to coincide with the 
proportion of permit holders that chose to fish independently. This corresponds to an allocation 
based on 1 = θ which, according to our model, disadvantages all independents. Rough 
calculations indicate that it would have been necessary to increase the independent sector’s per 
capita TAC allocation by at least 10% to ensure a Pareto improvement; instead it was reduced by 
40%. 
The lawsuit challenging the co-op policy was filed by Michael Grunert and Dean 
Anderson. Consistent with the model’s predictions, both were among the highest earning Chignik 
permit holders and neither joined the co-op. The fact that Grunert and Anderson filed the lawsuit 
in 2002 suggests that they assigned a positive probability to the number of joiners growing over 
time to the point where highliners would become disadvantaged, which clearly seems to be what 
happened by 2004.  
 
 
  344. Conclusions 
 
We have modeled the potential gains from coordinating the actions of common pool 
extractors and presented empirical evidence on these gains in the context of the fishery. Much of 
the received literature on fishery management emphasizes the ability of market-based instruments 
such as individual catch shares (ITQs) to eliminate redundant fishing units and end wasteful races 
that result from the rule of capture. We extend this work by demonstrating that the value of a 
common pool resource can be further enhanced by coordinating the actions of extractors. While 
individual rights holders lack incentives to coordinate, a harvesting group with the contractual 
authority to direct its members’ inputs can be structured to capture these gains, essentially by 
acting as a single firm. Coordination gains result from providing public inputs such as shared 
infrastructure and shared information on stock locations and from coordinating harvesters’ 
actions over space and time in cases where the value of stock varies over these dimensions. Our 
empirical results from the Chignik case indicate that the efficiency gains can be substantial.  
Allocating a portion of the allowed catch to a group of harvesters to manage as they see 
fit within broad constraints is a growing trend in fishery management. Examples from the U.S. 
are recently formed sector allocations for groundfish in the New England region, allocations to 
cooperatives for harvesting Alaska pollock and Pacific Whiting and the Chignik cooperative 
examined here. The reasons cited for this trend include points emphasized here: the relative ease 
of assigning rights among a few sectors and the gains from coordinating effort.
55  
The lawsuit that ended the co-op highlights a consideration seldom mentioned in the 
literature on common pool management—the value and difficulty of designing policy in a way 
that enables reform without losers. In the Chignik case, the question of whether or not the co-op’s 
formation would lead to a Pareto improvement was determined by three factors: the fact that 
joining the co-op was voluntary, the regulator’s rule for dividing the allowed catch between co-op 
and independent sectors, and the co-op’s internal rule for sharing profits. The co-op’s voluntary 
nature was advantageous because it provided a vehicle for limiting individual losses by allowing 
any dissenting parties to continue under a regime that resembled the status quo. To achieve actual 
loss avoidance, however, required a precise division of the allowed catch between sectors and this 
                                                 
55 Sullivan (2000) comments on the ease of assigning catch shares among members of two important 
fishing cooperatives. Evidence from New Zealand demonstrates that coordinating entities can be layered 
onto existing individual catch share systems, by allowing quota holders to form associations of harvesters 
to coordinate their actions. In New Zealand’s paua (abalone) and sea scallop fisheries, harvester groups 
have formed associations (or a single firm in the case of scallops) that allocate effort spatially, share 
information on stock densities, support research and stock enhancement efforts and carry out other actions 
that benefit the fishery as a whole. None of these actions is in the interest of any single harvester. 
  35was complicated by the fact that individuals self-selected into the two sectors on the basis of skill. 
In the Chignik case, higher skill fishermen chose to remain independent, necessitating that this 
sector receive a disproportionately large catch allocation. While the actual division incorporated 
this to a degree, it apparently did not go far enough. Finally, it is clear that the co-op could have 
altered its equal-profit share rule in a way that would have gained more support from high skill 
fishermen.
56 The co-op’s founders considered alternative profit share rules in initial deliberations, 
but these negotiations proved difficult. In the end a simple equal division rule was adopted. 
Despite evidence of potential gains from various forms of rights-based management,
 57 less than 
2% of the world’s fisheries currently employ the most prominent rights-based regime, the 
individual catch share.   At least three factors account for this dearth of implementation.  First, 
incumbent fishermen often vocally oppose catch shares on the grounds that they eliminate “free” 
access to the resource.  Second, the initial allocation of rights invites rent-seeking contention.  
Third, the individual transferable quota (ITQ) model that has achieved some success in Alaska, 
Iceland, New Zealand, and elsewhere, may still leave significant rents on the table by failing to 
achieve potential gains from coordinating the actions of independent quota holders. 
The rights-based approach exemplified by the Chignik experiment, with catch rights 
assigned to groups formed voluntarily, makes progress toward overcoming each of these 
impediments. It helps to defuse the right to fish argument by offering all participants the right to 
opt into a sector governed by the status quo management regime. While it does not eliminate 
wasteful struggles over the initial allocation, it arguably reduces the magnitude of the problem by 
assigning to voluntary groups the task of negotiating catch shares among their members, while 
requiring the regulator only to make the gross division of catch between sectors. Finally, by 
enabling coordination among individuals this approach can substantially increase rents in the 
fishery, making the often contentious process of reform a more lucrative positive sum game than 
it otherwise would be.   
 
                                                 
56 In fact, one of the two highliners who filed the suit that ended the co-op has argued in favor of a fishery 
management approach in which all harvesting is by cooperatives and co-op profits are shared in proportion 
to historic catch shares. See Anderson (2002). 
57 Evidence in favor of rights-based management is extensive.  Hannesson (2004) provides a broad review 
of theoretical and empirical work.  Grafton et al. (2000) found large increases in rents associated with 
introducing a right-based system for Canadian Halibut.  Leal (2002) surveys several US and Canadian ITQ 
programs and finds similar effects.  Linn et al. (2008) estimate that introducing a rights-based system for 
west coast groundfish in the U.S. could reduce costs by 60 percent, some $18-$20 million annually.  
Newell et al. (2005) document significant annual rents in New Zealand’s many ITQ programs.  Costello et 
al. (2008) document reductions in collapse from ITQs. 
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A.1  Co-op’s optimal policy 
The co-op’s optimal allocation minimizes 
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strictly increasing in  the optimal policy sets i d 0 = i d for each member. The term in brackets is 
the net benefit that the public input provides. Given assumed properties of the following 
first-order condition is necessary and sufficient for minimizing (A.1) with respect to : 
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This is the Samuelson condition for efficient public input provision. 
It remains to find an assignment of member fishing times that minimizes the fourth term 
in (A.1), subject to the catch constraint. The catch constraint for group J implies the following 
constraint on effort: 
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Index co-op members in increasing order of the ratio i i γ φ . Since i φ  and i γ are i’s cost per unit 
time and effort per unit time respectively, this ratio is i's cost per unit effort. Consider a policy, 
denoted Λ, which assigns fishing timeT to successive co-op members, in order of their index, 
until the constraint (A.3) is violated or satisfied with equality. If (A.3) is violated, let i indicate 
the highest indexed member in this low indexed subset and assign this member a fishing time that 
satisfies (A.3) exactly; all higher indexed members are assigned zero fishing time. This 
assignment satisfies the catch constraint by construction. To see that this assignment is cost 









. The term i iT γ is the fishing effort 
  41assigned to i and the ratio is i's cost per unit effort.  Any alternative to policy Λ would require 
reducing i iT γ by a lower indexed member and increasing i iT γ in the same amount by a higher 
indexed member. Since the index orders members in terms of the ratio i i γ φ , this alternative 
assignment would necessarily result in higher total cost. Therefore the assignment of fishing 
times in policy Λ is cost minimizing. 
 
A.2  Public input benefit per member increases with co-op size 
The public input confers a net benefit, per co-op member, of 
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Making use of the first-order condition (A.2) and simplifying, yields the desired result 
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  42Fig. A1 























Source:  Stichert (2007). 
 
Fig. A2 






















Source:  Stichert (2007). 
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Fig. A3 
Map of Chignik Bay and Near Vicinities 
 
Source:  Stichert (2007). 
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